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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRY R.

PROBST,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.
H,.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, J. BRENT WOOD

d/b/a KITCO, INC. AND STATE
FARM FIRE & CASUALTY,
Defendants.

:

)
:

)
:

)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for review of an order of the Industrial
Corrunission of Utah modifying an order previously entered by the
Hearing Examiner.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The hearing examiner in the Industrial Commission of Utah,
on April 5, 1977, awarded plaintiff $17,708.00 in disability
benefits as compensation for his injury, which award was based
on the maximum State average weekly wage.

Defendants filed

a motion to review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53 U.C.A. (1953,
as amended) and the matter was referred by the Hearing Examiner
to the CoIIlIIlission.

The Commission, on the 24th day of June, 1977

modified the Hearing Examiner's order by reducing the award to
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$12, 108. 58, plus medical expenses but allowing a credi' t •
•Ot
amounts already paid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Industrial

cormnission

order reversed on the grounds that the Commission acted arbitrar:
capriciously in reducing the Hearing Examiner's award

and k
•
see 1
to have the Hearing Examiner's original order reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 24, 1976, appellant, Probst was injured when

his left hand was crushed by a hydraulic machine.
hand was subsequently amputated.

Plaintiff's

(R. 41) At the time of his

injury appellant was nearly 22 years of age ( R. 26) and was
working for defendant Kitco, Inc.
Appellant applied for Workmens Compensation and on Januarv
31, 1977 a hearing was held in the Industrial Commission of Utai
The issue at that hearing was the calculation of plaintiff's
average weekly wage to provide a basis for an award of disabilir
payments, and the second issue was whether appellant was entitk
to a 15 percent increase in his award, representing a penalty
against the employer for maintaining an unsafe working envirOTIE'
The evidence showed that appellant was earning $2.50 per
hour (R. 56, 86) at the time of the injury and had it not been
for the injury would have worked approximate 1 Y 30 hour s that
( R. 28, 31, 32, 35, 54, and 55).

~1:

Appellant introducedevideni

.
h is
· \;ages co'
showing that with further training and experience
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reasonably be expected to be raised to $3.00 to $3.25 per hour
by Kitco.

(R. 86, 87)

There was no evidence offered by appellant,

however, to show how much he might have earned at the same type
of employment but for some other employer.

In other words there

was no evidence offered by plaintiff to show what the prevailing
wages were in the industry.
The Hearing Examiner allowed the parties to file memorandums
of law subsequent to the hearing.

Before either memorandum was

filed, however, the Hearing Examiner prepared a preliminary draft
of its findings and conclusions

( R. 128) indicating his intent

to award the appellant $9,699.06 in disability payments, based
on the amount appellant was earning at the time of the injury.
Appellant thereafter filed his memorandum (R. 130) arguing that
the Commission had the discretion to award a larger amount so
as to more "fairly compensate the claimant for his injuries."
Thereafter, but before respondent's memorandum was filed and without the benefit of respondent's memo the Hearing Examiner entered
his order (R. 141-147) awarding appellant disability benefits in
the amount of $17,708.00, based not on what the appellant was earning
at the time of the injury but on the maximum State average weekly
wage at the time of the injury.
Respondent-Defendants thereafter filed a motion for review
accompanied by their memorandum of law (R.148-161) and the matter
was referred to the Commission.

The Commission, on June 24, 1977

entered an order reducing the Hearing Examiner's award to $12,108.58
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less amounts already paid, based on an average weekly wage
reflecting not what the appellant was earning at the time of
the injury nor the maximum State average weekly wage but an
amount in between representing what the claimant might reason,

a~.

expected to have earned in the future through wage increases
at the same employment.

(R. 176-180).

Plaintiff-appellant relying on Section 35-1-76 U.C.A. (!~);
as amended), argues that the Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in basing its award for disability payments on thE
amount that plaintiff might reasonably expect to earn in the
future through wage increases in the same employment, and maint:.
that since the appellant has recently earned as high as $6.00
per hour in other unrelated employment, the Connnission should
have based its award on the maximum State average weekly wage.
The Commission found that appellant was temporarily total!
disabled for 18 weeks and 2 days, and should have been compensate
for the loss of his hand for 168 weeks for permanent partial
disability.

Neither appellant nor respondent have disputed thi:

particular finding.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR
CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT BASED ITS AWARD TO APPELLANT ON
COMPENSATION APPELLA~ff MAY HAVE EAR..f\lED IN THE FUTURE BUT
WITHIN THE SAME E11PLOYHENT.
Appellant Is argument is based on Section 35-1-76 u.c.A.

(1953 as amended).

That Section provides:
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"If i t is established that the injured employee
was of such age and experience when injured that
und7r natural conditions his wages would be expected
to increase, that fact may be considered in arriving
at his average weekly wage."

Appellant argues that this statute gives the Commission a
freehand to calculate an injured person's average weekly wage
based on what he might expect to earn in the future in some other
entirely unrelated but more lucrative employment.

The Commission

disagreed, ruling that while this statute was applicable it nevertheless has certain restrictions, and that while the Commission
may consider future wage increases they must consider only those
wage increases that are reasonably to be expected within the same
employment as the claimant is engaged in at the time of the injury.
While it is to be expected that appellant would seek a
greater award, it cannot be said that the Commissionacted arbitrarily

and capriciously in awarding the lesser amount limited

to expected wage increases within the same employment. The
evidence introduced by appellant himself was that he was earning
$2.SO an hour at the time of the injury but could have expected
to earn as much as $3.25 an hour with further training and experience
in the same employment.

The Commission in making its award used

the higher figure of $3.25 an hour to calculate plaintiff's average
weekly wage. There is clearly substantial evidence therefore to
support the Commission's award and appellant has not shown
in what respect the Commission was arbitrary or capricious.
Naturally we must sympathize with appellant and we do not
intend in any way to minimize the severity of his injury.

This
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•
Court, as well as many others, however

have ruled th t
'
a where
statutes such as Section 35-1-76 are applicable the
'
•
Y must be
applied with certain restrictions, and that they a re not intena:
to vest the Commission with the broad discretion t o d'isregard t:
formulas for calculating average weekly wage.
The court should note at this point that a strong argument
can be made, and was made in the Industrial Commission by defe}
dants, that Section 35-1- 76 is not at all applicable under the
facts of this case, and that accordingly the Commission's aware
should have been based on plaintiff's wages at the time of the
injury or $2. 50 an hour.

The case of Brewer vs. Industrial

Commission, et al 89 Utah 596, 58 P. 2d 33 (1936) intrepreted tL
identical statute.

In that case an employee was killed in an

accident arising out of his employment as a coal miner.

The

State insurance fund assumed liability and paid benefits to thE
widow and the six minor children based upon the employee's wagE
of $3. 00 per day at the time of the injury which resulted in hi:
death.

The widow argued that she was entitled to an increased

award based on the belief that her husband may reasonably have
been expected to earn $5. 00 to $8. 00 per day in the near future.
The Court rejected this argument stating that this particular
statute has a more restricted application.

In support of its
of Industr~
position the court quoted with approval f rom t h e case
~
7 JJ'
Cormnission of Ohio vs. Royer, 122 Ohio St 271, 171 N.E. 33 , c
wherein that Court in interpreting an identical statute stated:
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"Manifestly it was not intended that the
have a freehand in awarding
compensation in an excess of two-thirds of the
average wage at the time of the injury, neither
was it intended that a jury should be given
the same latitude. The award of compensation is
not a matter of discretion, and neither the
Commission nor Courts and Juries may disregard
the measure of compensation which the statute
provides, nor may they be moved by either
sympathy or prejudice."
Commissio~ sh~uld

The Utah Supreme Court stated:
"This section must be read in connection with the
previous one which definitely makes the basis
of compensation the average weekly wage of the
employee at the time of injury. The section
was intended to have a restricted application.
The provision is peculiarly adapted to apply
in case of minors or persons of immature years
whose wages are usually less than that of adults
in like employment, but who would be expected
naturally and normally to reach the wage scale
of adults with increasing years and experience."
Id. at 36.
The facts and circumstances of the instant case are not,
according to Utah Supreme Court appropriate to enlist the aid
of Section 35-1-76.

Mr. Probst was not a minor or person of

immature years at the time of the injury, but was one month
short of reaching his 22nd birthday at the time of the injury,
was married shortly after the injury and, furthermore, there
is no evidence whatsoever that by reason of his age he was
earning less than older adults employed at the same work.
The Commission, however, did find that this statute was
applicable in this case but that it must be applied in a reasonably
restrictive manner and does not open the doors to the Commission
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to calculate a claimant's average weekly wage i·n wh a t ever manner
they choose.

On this particular point the Brewer case, Citing

the Royer case is also instructive.

The Court stated:

"~nfortunat7l:(, t~e legislature h<:s not clearly
fixed the limitations of the consideration to
be given to age and experience; yet there must
necessarily be certain limitations, because every inj·
employee has both age and experience to his credit u..
and greater age and experience in prospect. If '
it was meant to confer an unlimited discretion
there was no occasion to employ the consideration
of age and experien("'"'. To permit the Commission
or a Jury to so interpret the expression relating
to age and experience and to permit liberal awards
that discretion would bring the whole subject of
awards into a state of uncertainty."

This Court was comfortable in citing the Ohio case Royer

1
i

supra, since, as this court pointed out, its law is practically I
identical to ours, and that large portions of our workrnens com·
pensation laws were taken from the Ohio law,

The Utah Supreme

Court, again quoting Royer, stated:
"In the absence of leeislative interpretation we are
of the opinion that age and experience should only
be considered in the case of persons of immature
years who have not yet become skillfull in the
particular employment in which they were engaged at
the time of the injury. Those terms should not be
held to apply to all ambitious persons on the, sole
ground that they aspire to promotion in mor~ important, more skillfull, and more remunerative
employment." Id at 35.
The Court in Brewer, also quoted with approval from the
case of Raymond Gagnon's C3.se, 228 Mass. 334, 117 N.E. 321, when
an injured employee was an 18 year old boy but where the court ir.
,

o'I

interpreting an almost identical statute limited determination·
the weekly wage to the probable natural increase of wages
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of~:

injured party in the same employment in which he was engaged
when injured.

That court stated:

"This interpretation is confirmed by practical
considerations.
The scheme of the act is that the employer shall
be insured against the losses from personal injury
to employees arising out of and in the course of
their employment. The cost of such insurance can
be determined so long as the basis on which compensation is to be reckoned is wages paid by
the employer. It can readily be determined so
long as the standard fixed by the definition of
average weekly wages . . . is followed. But it
would be a matter of utter uncertainty if the
compensation to be paid should depend, not upon
wages paid, but upon wages which the Industrial
Accident Board after an injury may find upon
independant evidence, perhaps not readily opened
to the employer during the period of employment,
that the injured employee might have earned in
some other employment or field of activity."
In the case of Gruber vs. Kramer Amusement Corp. et al 207
App. Div. 564, 202 N.Y.S. 413 (1924), the injured employee was
a 17 year old boy who was employed as a helper and received
$4.00 per day at an amusement park.

While engaged in his regular

work his foot was crushed by one of the cars.

The employee con-

tended that his average weekly wage should be based on what he
might be expected to earn in other employment, as a machinist or

a plumber's helper.

The court ruled that his compensation must

be based on his employment at the time of the injury and stated:
"In the case of a minor as of other employees, we
must seek his average weekly wages in the employment in which he was injure~ not in some other
employment. We may not speculate upon what other
more lucrative employment a minor might enter."
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In discussing this very issue in 99 C. J. S. Workmens Compensation, Section 65 (f) it states, in interpreting statues
similar to Section 35-1-76:
"However the possible increase must be in the
wages in the employment in which he was injured
and not some other more lucrative employment which
he might enter. . . "
In all of the cases cited, the courts recognize that if
the average weekly wage was to be increased at all to

there~

increase the award, the increase must be limited to the same
employment if it was probable and natural that the employee
could expect an increase of wages.
Plaintiff-appellant relies heavily on two New York cases,
Donnelly vs. Buffalo Evening News, Inc.,

174 N.Y.S.2d 361 (19\c'

and Haldane vs. Buffalo Evening News 174 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1958).Tr.i
court should note that under either of those cases the plaintiff·
appellant in the instant case would have no argument at all sinci
the New York statute applies only to minors, whereas in this cas1
the plaintiff-appellant is a 22 year old adult.

Moreoever both

of those cases emphasize the peculiar and special circumstances:
a young news boy delivering newspapers for an employer.

The cour

in Donnelly recognized the rule that a finding of wage expectanc:
must be limited to the same or similar employment, as well it

mw

in view of its earlier holding in Gruber supra, but stated that

to the peculiar and unusual st•

this rule should not apply "
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of a newsboy."

The plaintiff-appellant also cites two Oklahoma

cases, Harmon's Texaco Station vs. Kessinger, 365 P.2d 131 (Okla.
l961) and Williamsen vs. Grimm 425 P. 2d 992 (Okla. 1967).

Again

the statutes being construed in those cases applied strictly
to minors, and under those statutes the plaintiff-appellant in
this case would have had no basis whatsoever for his argument.
Not one of the other many cases cited by plaintiff-appellant
have anything whatsoever to do with the issues involved in this
action.

Those cases dealt with the continuing jurisdiction of

the conunission, interpretations of Section 35-1-69 U.C.A., definition

of employees, admissibility of heresay evidence and

other matters, but none of them interpreted the statute here in
question, and are not helpful in the instant case.
Significantly, the very action that the plaintiff-appellant
now complains of is the action that the plaintiff-appellant urged
the Corrrrnission to take in the initial proceedings in the Industrial
ColIIlllission.

In his memorandum of law, filed with the Industrial

ColIIlllission after the hearing on the merits, plaintiff-appellant
argued that by virtue of Section 35-1-76 he was entitled to have
his average weekly wage increased based on an expected wage of
$3.25 per hour, in light of his age and experience. (R.130-135).

Plaintiff-appellant did not at that time claim that Section 35-1-76

u;·
I

authorized the Commission to increase the average weekly wage to
the maximum amount permitted by law as he now urges this court to
do,

...

Rather plaintiff-appellant argued that this particular section
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authorized the Commission to use the $3. 25 per hour figure as
a basis for calculating his average weekly wage.

The Industrial

Commission has now done that and rather than accept their de . ,
cisio:
plaintiff-appellant has appealed to this court to find that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

The Industrial

Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously but simply
followed the guideline set down in the cases and other authorith
in Utah and elsewhere which have addressed this issue, and accora~
ly their action should be affirmed.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AS TO WAGES IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT
IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED.

Plaintiff-appellant was represented by counsel at the
hearing in this matter and had full opportunity to present
witnesses and evidence on all of the issues involved in this
case.

Plaintiff-appellant's counsel had the opportunity

to, and did, cross-examine the witnesses produced by the defen·
dants (R. 77).

At that time plaintiff-appellant's counsel

introduced evidence tending to show the amount of wages that
were generally paid by defendant in the same employment that
plaintiff-appellant was engaged, and what wages plaintiff-appel·
lant might reasonably be expected to earn should he receive furt':
training and experience in the same employment.

There was never!

any evidence offered by plaintiff-appellant to show that wages
. same type o f emp 1 oymen t , nor indeed
were industry-wide in t h is
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was there any evidence that such measure of wages could be

made.

There was no evidence to show that the kind of work

performed by plaintiff-appellant was performed in other companies,
50

that an accurate measure could be made.

Plaintiff-appellant

had every opportunity to present evidence on this issue but
failed to do so and cannot now be heard to complain.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above defendant-respondents respect-

fully request that the Industrial Commission's actions be
affirmed.
Dated this 18th day of May, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

i

;J ~- le__/( .,__
~KG. NOEL
~
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief to Bryce D. McEuen,
Attorney at Law, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah

84601, this

18th day of May, 1978.
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